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Abstract 
This chapter examines current conceptual and empirical thinking about economic regionalization 
within the global economy, particularly in light of debates about the potential retreat of economic 
globalization in the second decade of the twenty-first century. It provides an overview of theories 
of economic regionalization as well as how this concept relates to wider debates about 
globalization. In doing so, it argues that while there is both a deepening of economic 
regionalization in some parts of the global economy - and a new geography to this process - it 
does not represent an overall reversal of wider trends toward greater global economic integration. 
The chapter illustrates this argument through considering a number of examples at firm, industry 
and regional level. 
 
Keywords: globalization, regionalization, global economy, regional economies, 
transnational firms 
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1) Introduction 
After several decades of debate within human geography and other social sciences disciplines 
about the concept of globalization, in the second decade of the twenty-first century there has 
been a growing set of arguments developed that globalization is in retreat (Lund et al 2013; 
Bodoni & Surgun 2017). Understood as the broad integration and growing interconnectedness of 
all aspects of social life at the planet-wide scale (Jones 2010), a large proportion of the 
globalization debate has focused on a narrow aspect – the globalization of economic activity. In 
fact, in popular debates in the media and politics, globalization is itself often equated with 
economic globalization – the power of transnational corporations, the shift of manufacturing 
production to different locations around the globe or the nature of globalized finance (Ritzer & 
Dean 2015). It is in that context also that more recent interventions have sought to suggest a 
retreat from (economic) globalization and a retrenchment towards the regional scale in the 
integration of economic activities. Over the last decade, therefore, the concept of economic 
regionalization has been widely associated as being in many senses in tension or even the 
opposite of the neoliberal economic globalization experienced across the global economy since 
the 1980s (Sunkel & Inotai 2016). Rather than the unbridled and unchecked integration of 
economic activities at the global scale as expressed in the hyper-globalization of the 1990s (c.f. 
Held et al 1999), economic globalization has diminished and reduced as a process and economic 
activity has receded to the regional scale (Cooper et al  2007; Altman 2009). Economic 
regionalization in this sense is often defined as the intensification and focus of economic 
activities within regions at the expense of linkages and organizational arrangements of greater 
distances. In the current era of resurgent nationalism in the advanced industrial economies of 
Europe and north America (Cull 2016), along with political debates about increasing national 
economic protectionism (Greenaway et al 2016), it would appear that economic globalization 
and economic regionalization are in thus in tension and competing trends.  
 The key argument developed in this chapter, however, is that they are not and that a more 
sophisticated understanding of economic regionalization reveals how its development is 
entwined with wider globalization processes that have continued but evolved in the last fifty 
years. Despite widespread lack of clarity – as well as a tendency to counterpose these concepts as 
opposites – economic regionalization needs to be seen as another manifestation of economic 
integration across space that is entwined rather than in contradiction with more generalized 
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globalization. That is not to say that regionalization and globalization amount to the same thing, 
nor that there are not countervailing tendencies where global scale integration has been 
superceded by intensifying integration at the regional scale. Rather the argument is that where 
globalization does appear to have been ‘replaced’ by stronger trends of regionalization, this 
intensification at the regional level remains strongly embedded in wider context of simultaneous 
global scale integration. 
 To understand these arguments in more depth, the chapter first addresses some key 
conceptual issues of definition that also have not been clear in the social science debate about 
economic regionalization. In the next section, it briefly examines how economic globalization 
itself might be defined and the various facets to this process in the contemporary global 
economy. In the following section, it then uses this discussion to offer a definition of economic 
regionalization but also consider the significant challenges that exist in understanding the process 
and what is meant by ‘a region’ itself. The fourth part of the chapter moves on to develop the 
argument that counterposing economic globalization with economic regionalization amounts to a 
false dichotomy, elaborating the contention that there is a need to develop a more sophisticated 
conceptualization of the nature of economic regionalization. Finally, the chapter draws together 
some conclusions about how economic regionalization might be better understood in future 
theoretical and policy debates. 
 
 
2) Defining economic globalization 
To understand the contemporary context of economic regionalization as a process, and what we 
might mean by that, we first need to frame this understanding around the broader idea of 
economic globalization. In this respect, if the concept of globalization itself refers to ‘societal 
integration at the planetary scale’ (Jones 2006) in general, then undoubtedly the globalization of 
economic activity has and continues to play a very central role in this process. We can therefore 
define economic globalization as the growing integration and interconnectedness of a range of 
different dimensions to the capitalist world economy, and whilst this has been going on for many 
centuries, it is more the intense phase of economic globalization that has occurred since the end 
of the Second World War which has most concerned social scientists (Scholte 2005; Bisley 
2007). Since the later part of the twentieth century, social scientists from a range of disciplines 
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have argued that processes of economic globalization have made it increasingly appropriate to 
refer to one, integrated global economy (Dicken 2015). There are a range of factors that have led 
to this situation in the last forty or fifty years – the changing nature of international politics, 
deregulation, new information and communication technologies are just a few – but overall the 
degree to which economic activity in the twenty-first century is interconnected across the globe 
is greater than at any point in human history. For geographical thinkers and regional scientists, 
central to their analysis is to try to better understand and theorise how these processes have been 
uneven with very different impacts in different parts of the globe and between different regions 
(Mackinnon & Cumbers 2014). It is worth considering in more depth the historical development 
of this process. There are three key aspects I would suggest are important. 
 Firstly, something that might be called world economy has existed throughout human 
history but, until relatively recently, economic activity was largely was confined to the places 
and localities where it was undertaken (Held et al 1999). In pre-industrial societies, economic 
activity entailed the production of food and various manufactured goods that were largely 
produced and consumed in the same local areas. However, notwithstanding this, the earliest form 
of what we might regard as economic globalization does have a long history in the form of trade 
between continents, regions and more recently (in the modern period) across national borders. In 
that sense, the integration of economic activity stretches back into antiquity, and human history 
over the last three millennia has seen a variety of different local regional, globally extensive 
trading systems (ibid.). Early processes of economic globalization are evident a surprisingly long 
way back with, for example, the Roman Empire organising cross- continental economic activity 
around trade. The Chinese empire that existed for more than a thousand years in the middle ages 
also extended currencies, trade and other limited forms of economic activity at an inter- 
continental scale (Hobsbawm 2007). In that sense, in the medieval period we can talk about a 
world economy. However, and of particular importance to understand, its degree of global 
integration is very limited even if a few global-scale interconnections did exist (Held et al 1999; 
Ritzer & Dean 2015). That is to say, whilst there were a surprising number of global scale 
linkages, their number, volume and intensity were very limited. 
 Second, what we mean by economic globalization in today’s world is related to the nature 
of today’s capitalist world economy that has developed since the sixteenth century, and which 
has been ‘global in its scope’ since the nineteenth century (Wallerstein 1974; 1979). Capitalism 
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as a form of economic organization emerged in western Europe and spread out through the globe 
through European colonial expansion and then later empires. During the twentieth century, an 
international system of nation-states gradually replaced these empires to cover the world map. 
However, early economic globalization was sporadic in nature. During the nineteenth century, 
there was considerable integration of many new parts of the world into the capitalist system, but 
the two world wars and their political consequences in the first half of the twentieth century 
interrupted and in fact reduced some of this economic integration (Hirst, Thompson & Bromley 
2015). The world that emerged in 1945 after the Second World War was divided between the 
capitalist first world, the communist second world and the developing third world. This ‘tri-
partite’ world had a range of barriers to further economic integration with states regulating how 
much money and how many goods and services could be traded across national borders. A large 
part of the global map was communist and disconnected from the capitalist world economy 
altogether (Flint & Taylor 2007) 
 Third and finally, since the early 1970s this situation changed and the disconnected world 
economic system began to become more interconnected in a number of ways. During the 1970s, 
the degree of regulation of money exchange, flows and trade was progressively reduced as nation 
states and international organisations removed restrictions (Garrett 2000; Holton 2001). In the 
advanced industrial first world, it became much easier to move money around the globe, for 
companies to invest overseas and for goods and services to be exported to new markets. This 
financial globalization was therefore an important basis for wider economic globalization 
because - when combined in the 1980s with new informational and communications technologies 
- it made it easier to move goods, people and services, for overseas investments to be made and 
for economic activity to organised at the international level (Castells 2009). However, the extent 
and pace of these economic globalization processes accelerated dramatically during the 1990s. 
The central reason was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the re-integration of most of the 
communist second world into the global capitalist economic system. Even those states that 
remained communist - most notably China – largely sought to open their economies to the world 
capitalist economy. Combined with further deregulation and liberalization of international trade 
associated with an increasingly dominant neoliberal ideology and ongoing advances in 
information technologies, economic activity became increasingly interconnected across all 
national borders. It is therefore in the last 40 years that it has become meaningful to refer to a 
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globalized economy since more or less most nation-states across the globe are integrated into the 
capitalist world economy (c.f. Gilpin & Gilpin 2000; Wallerstein 2004) 
 The trajectory of this much more advanced integration of the world economy into one 
global capitalist economy in recent decades has been deeply uneven, and there are a range of 
social scientific theorists who have argued that integration has been strongest at a regional rather 
than a global level (e.g. Rugman 2001). In this respect, economic globalization in general has 
been arguably been characterized by underpinning processes of economic regionalization 
occurring at the same time and as part of the wider process. There is however a considerable 
debate as to whether economic regionalization is just part of wider globalization, or represents a 
different process that cannot be subsumed into globalization in general. The next task of this 
chapter is therefore to examine the complexities around defining economic regionalization. 
 
 
3) What is meant by economic regionalization? 
Economic regionalization in its simplest and intuitive sense can be understood as a process 
whereby economic activity becomes increasingly focused and concentrated within regional 
territorial space. An important implication underpins this idea which is that for economic 
regionalization to occur, economic activity must be diminishing in its focus or constitution across 
other scales. If economic activity is more regionalized, then it follows that it is becoming less 
localized or globalized (scales ‘above’ and ‘below’ that of the region respectively) (c.f. Sheppard 
2002). Regionalization thus often implies the prevalence of the regional scale as the increasingly 
important scale at which economic activity is organized in relation to others. An example might 
be where a group of firms that have global supply chain linkages with firms located across the 
planet, replace those linkages with ones to firms within the sub-national region in which they are 
located. In this respect, by definition economic regionalization as a process largely presupposes 
the existence of a coherent thing that might be understood as a ‘regional economy’.  
 However, he concept of the regional economy – as discussed elsewhere in this book – is 
not necessarily straightforward and is problematic around at least three interrelated aspects – 
first, whether regions are sub-national or supra-national entities (or both); second is the question 
of what bounds the region or the regional scale (where does one region end and another begin?); 
8 
 
and third,  the extent to which economic activity located within a region part of an economy that 
can be understood to be ‘contained’ in that territorial space (c.f. Agnew 1994). 
 With regard to the first of these issues, the concept of the regional economy is widely used 
as both a description of global scale groupings of national economies (e.g. the Eurozone 
economy or the South American economy), and sub-national regions (e.g. the Californian 
economy, the Baden-Wurttenberg region in southern Germany or the ‘coastal’ regional economy 
of China). It is important to realise that there are thus important differences between these two 
types of regional economies. Supra-national regional economies are essentially amalgamations 
of separate national economies (e.g. the Asian economy as China, South Korea, Japan etc) that 
have clear national borders between them but which are (generally) adjacent in territorial terms. 
The internal and external boundaries of these supranational regions are usually straightforward to 
identify insofar as they follow the national borders of states. Yet these two different types of 
regional economies are often not clearly differentiated. Media discussion of regional economies, 
for example, often treats sub-national and supranational regional economies similarly, referring 
to the fortunes of the ‘south Asian or east Asian economies’ (supranational) in the same terms 
the as southern Indian economy or Chinese coastal regions (sub-national). The important issue is 
that the scale, boundaries, governance and coherence of these ‘regional economies’ in fact varies 
considerably. 
 Coming to the second issue, the boundaries of regional economies are ill-defined and used 
variably. Different nation states are included in different supranational regional economies – for 
example, is Indonesia in the south-east Asian regional economy? There is often no definitive 
answer with different agencies, commentators or organizations including different sets of 
national economies in their understanding of a given supra-national regional economy according 
to their purpose. This is further complicated by formal free-trade associations which overlap but 
do not fully incorporate all the national economies within a geographical region. Not all 
European countries are in the European Union, but the concept of the European (or even just 
west European) regional economy can be used either including or excluding non-EU member 
states. The boundaries of sub-national regional economies are even harder to demarcate, 
however, and used with greater inconsistency and lack of precision. Within the EU, for example, 
the European Union devised a set of standard territorial units (known as NUTs after the French 
nomenclature d'unités territoriales statistiques) based on administrative districts that 
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government, policy-makers and research use. For policy purposes, the EU often defines regional 
economies around these NUTs units, but in wider usage by different government, policy, 
research and media sub-national regional economies are much more loosely and variably 
specified. Where in the UK the boundaries of east Midlands or north-east regional economies 
can be drawn is not universally recognized. Similarly, there are competing definitions of what 
represents the southern boundary of the northern Italian economy, or the economy of the 
southern United States. Such regional economies are generally understood in terms of the major 
areas they cover (Milan is part of the northern Italian economy and Rome is not), but there are 
not consistent uses and definitions of places that are more at the periphery of these regions. 
Clearly, classifications of regional economies based on administrative districts are more distinct 
(e.g. the economy of Galicia in Spain, the US state of Texas or Sichuan province in China), but 
frequently when a sub-national regional economy is referred to, there is imprecision, 
inconsistency or lack of agreement on boundaries. 
 Finally, and related to the third question, is the most difficult issue of all: the degree of 
which an economic activity can be understood to have occurred or exist within a given regional 
territorial space or scale (c.f. Marston 2000). Whilst in a straightforward manner, firms have 
factories, offices and production facilities in given territorial places (in that sense the economy 
always happens somewhere), the contemporary production of goods and services is increasingly 
distributed across multiple locations. A great deal of the global economy’s outputs are products 
accounted for by a relatively limited number of very large transnational firms, their subsidiaries 
and supply chains in most industries (UNCTAD 2016). This shift in recent decades -  and with 
the internationalization of firms and production - means that many material good are 
manufactured across multiple places with components (and their components) originating from 
different places. This significantly complicates what we might understand the economy of a 
region to ‘be’ which, if measured, restricts economic activity to a territorial container that in 
many senses it is constantly transgressing. Of course governments, policy-makers and 
researchers all seek to measure the economies of regions in terms of the wealth generated and the 
firms and jobs that exist in those territorial places, but in reality these measures are imperfect and 
need to account for how the economic activity within a region may be heavily embroiled and 
dependent upon lots of activity not occurring in that territory. A good example would be a car 
assembly plant whose operation relies on hundreds of components being manufacturing by many 
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different firms in many different places outside the region it was located in (Liu & Dicken 2006).  
In that sense a concept of the process of economic regionalization which is based on the 
development of economic activity in a given territory is often likely - in today’s global economy 
- to still be heavily bound into economic activities not occurring within that territory.  
 Overall, therefore, the general definition of economic regionalization as a process of the 
concentration and greater focus of economic activity within a regional territory is broadly 
meaningful if the problematic issues identified above are taken into consideration. We can refer 
to this process in the abstract but it exists always in a scalar contrast that is also blurred at its 
boundaries and limits. Regionalization occurs at the expenses of larger or smaller territorial units 
(the nation above and localities below), and where regions ‘start’ and ‘stop’ in territory is 
inconsistent and arbitrarily defined in a way that the nature of economic activity does not 
necessarily respect. Most of all, however, in today’s world, economic activity is only at best 
partially ‘contained’ within territorial space and this sits uncomfortably with the opposition of 
economic regionalization as a process that contrasts or counters economic globalization. It is 
therefore to this issue we turn next. 
 
 
3) Regionalization versus globalization? The false dichotomy… 
Much of the globalization debate of the last thirty years has only intermittently and often 
partially engaged with the complex spatialities of globalization processes and global societal 
integration (c.f. Amin 2002). During the 1990s, debates about globalization were often framed 
around simplistic understandings of globalization as creating homogeneity and sameness (Bisley 
2007) and the longstanding simplistic idea that this constitutes an ‘end of geography’ (c.f. 
O’Brien 1991; Friedman 2007). Globalization was in this sense seen as a process by which 
places and their attributes became increasingly the same – manifest in arguments about the loss 
of local cultural difference, the presence of the same transnational corporations (TNCs) across 
the planet, selling similar products and creating a convergence of economies, cultures, politics 
and other aspects of society. Whilst the last decade has seen such perspectives strongly 
challenged and a more diverse and sophisticated approach to understanding what globalization 
‘is’ (as a complex set of tendencies rather than a singular process or end state (Dicken 2015), 
much discussion of globalization within a range of social science disciplines still does not 
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foreground the intrinsic spatio-temporal nature of the transformations it is associated with (Jones 
2010). In considering both the debate about economic regionalization in relation to globalization, 
and its limitation, I want to argue that a conceptual understanding of the spatial and temporal 
aspects to economic integration that underpin both what is being often termed economic 
regionalization and economic globalization in the contemporary global economy provides a 
theoretical path through many of the challenges. 
 The starting point for understanding this debate is the way in which through the emerging 
globalization debate of the 1990s, the argument was developed that globalization was not as 
pervasive as some of the leading thinkers and commentators were arguing. A number of social 
scientific thinkers from different disciplines spanning sociology, geography, management 
studies, international business and anthropology countered the ‘hyperglobalist’ argument that 
saw globalization as an unstoppable force by empirically-backed interventions that pointed to 
how economic activity continued to be heavily concentrated in regions, and that much of the 
argument about economic globalization rested on the increasing interlinkage of regional 
economies across the globe (e.g. Amin & Thrift 1995; Scott 1999). This argument was 
developed around both clusters of firms and industries in regions and in understanding how 
transnational corporations organised themselves across the global economy (Coe et al 2012; 
Dicken 2015). A leading international business thinkers, Alan Rugman, provided a significant 
intervention that exemplifies this in arguing that (economic) globalization was ‘at an end’ in the 
early 2000s. His argument was based on empirical analysis of leading TNCs in a wide range of 
sectors which he argued showed increased economic regionalization not economic globalization 
– firms activities were increasingly integrated at the supranational regional level but not at the 
‘truly’ global scale (Rugman 2001). The globalization theorists were, in short, overstating the 
extent of global-scale integration, but the current period in fact represented an unprecedented 
period of economic regionalization. TNCs were not the harbingers of economic globalization, 
but deepened economic regionalization (ibid.). 
 Another prong to this critique of economic globalization also came from political science 
(e.g. Boyer & Drache 2005) and management studies (e.g. Meyer et al 2011) which examined 
patterns of global trade and foreign direct investment to make similar arguments to Rugman 
around growing regionalization rather than ‘true’ globalization. The contention in this strand of 
work is that most of the world’s nation states trade most with their near (supranational) regional 
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neighbours (Hirst, Thompson & Bromley 2015). To a lesser extent, the same is also true in 
relation to foreign direct investment (FDI) (Holton 2001). The extent, therefore, in recent 
decades of the development of a level playing field of global trade and investment, flowing 
relatively unrestricted across borders, was challenged on the grounds that much of the world’s 
economic activity is focused around supranational regions. Whilst there has been the 
development of global-scale linkages, the counter argument was that this represents only a 
modest fraction of cross-national economic activity. In simple terms, such a point continues to be 
captured in the fact that most European economies do most trade with other European states, the 
US with Canada and Mexico and the south American states with each other (both those within 
and outside the Mercosur trading bloc) (Hirst, Thompson & Bromley 2015). There has thus 
undoubtedly been an ongoing growth in the volume of trans-continental trade over the last few 
decades, notably as China and other Asian economies have grown substantially as well as more 
modest integration of some African states into patterns of global trade and investment, but 
supranational regional economic linkages still dominate numerically. In that respect it would 
seem there is considerable validity in the view that economic globalization has been overstated 
where in fact economic regionalization is the more dominant process. This has been amplified 
over the last 5 years or so through the debate about the apparent ‘retreat of globalization’ and era 
of increased trade protectionism (whether than be the challenges to the European Union or the 
dissatisfaction with NATFA in the USA). 
 However, in this final part of this chapter I want to elaborate the argument that to a large 
extent this debate is misconceived around a false division between two intertwined processes. 
The issues rests on the way in which several social science disciplines have developed theoretical 
understandings of the integration of economic activity using certain sets of data that do not fully 
capture all of the transformations to the global economy that have been occurring. To a large 
extent the conception of a (hyperglobalist) economic globalization - where global-scale 
economic integration occurs relatively easily and potentially equally everywhere - was premised 
on the evidence of new and unprecedented levels of relationships at the planetary scale. This was 
challenged with data on the volumes of trade and investment which are measured between 
nation-states, and the extent to which greater volumes occurred between states within 
supranational regions or which were more distant from each other. Similarly, within international 
business, the data used by Rugman (2001) and others to provide the empirical basis for arguing 
13 
 
for regionalization over globalization is based on firm datasets collected around nationally-
registered firms or subsidiaries and based on the location of their registered activities. Whilst 
both approaches do offer insight into macro-level changes in the global economy, there are 
significant limitations around the theoretical arguments that can be developed using datasets of 
this nature. Trade data does not tell you about the nature of the economic relationship 
underpinning a transaction, for example, and increasingly captures different subsidiaries of the 
same TNC ‘trading’ with each other. Equally location-based data for firm head offices and 
subsidiaries provides little insight into the nature of activities undertaken in certain places and 
their relation to others. This limits the understanding of the nature of economic activity in given 
territorial spaces and therefore the scope to differentiate whether these activities are actually well 
understood as being ‘contained’ within states, regions or part of global-scale activity. 
 In fact, and in contrast to this simple opposition of globalization and regionalization, other 
strands of firm-level work within economic geography and management studies have shown that 
the deepening of global-scale and regional-scale (both subnational and supranational) economic 
integration are often interdependent. Research into the way that TNCs have constructed complex 
global production networks (GPNs) (Coe & Yeung 2015) reveals how manufacturing in many 
industries is now a global scale activity orchestrated by firms involving sometimes hundreds and 
subsidiary and sub-contracting supply firms in dozens of locations around the globe (c.f. 
Dunning & Lundan 2008). However, and importantly, these complex production networks are 
not evenly distributed across global economic space but also often incorporate  regionalized 
concentrations around clusters of firms in certain industries or sub-sectors (Storper 1997). Good 
examples of this would be the aircraft industry, dominated by a small number of very large 
transnational firms such as Boeing and Airbus (c.f. Ferdows 1997). Both have areas of historical 
assembly, research and development (the Pacific north-west of the US for Boeing, or the south-
west of France for Airbus), but are drawing on supply chains where components are coming 
from clusters of firms in those and other regions. Similarly in electronics, Apple is famously 
centred on the Californian economy, but its manufacturing operations in China have produced 
both a regional concentration of supply firms and economic development in several of the 
southern coastal provinces and global-scale component production networks stretching across 
many continents (Coe & Yeung 2015). 
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 They key point is that to a large extent economic globalization and economic 
regionalization are co-dependent processes occurring in synchrony. The concentration and 
development of certain types of firm clusters and industries in one region is related to global-
scale linkages through multiple production networks and supply chains. This is not to over-
simplify our understanding of these processes – there are certainly many cases of regionalization 
being less related to global-scale linkages, or global-scale linkages having less of an impact on 
the nature of a regional economy. Rather the argument is that with the increasing complexity of 
economic linkages between networks of large TNCs in the global economy, dividing our concept 
of economic integration between a regional and a global-level process is unhelpful and may 
conceal more than it reveals.   
 
 
4) Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has to provide an overview of the concept of economic regionalization in 
relation to regional development, and in particular how it relates to the wider concept of 
economic globalization. It should be clear that the way regionalization has been discussed across 
social scientific thinking and research over the last thirty years is inextricably bound into the 
wider debate about economic globalization, and that it is important in considering what is meant 
by this process in the context of those wider debates. The analysis has considered how much of 
the surrounding conceptual debate has been framed around the idea that economic 
regionalization is in some way a countervailing process to wider economic globalization: in short 
that economic activity is becoming more regionally-focused as opposed to either ‘truly’ 
globalized, or to a lesser extent more localized. The main argument that has been developed in 
relation to this is that the terms of this debate are misconstrued, and that to a considerable extent 
what we may understand as economic regionalization and economic globalization respectively 
are overlapping and entwined processes. Whilst in some contexts it might be relevant to see these 
as opposing trends in the spatial configuration of economic activity, a wider academic literature 
reveals the complexity of how these processes are often occurring not only simultaneously but as 
a consequence of each other. Furthermore, recent debates concerned with the apparent ‘retreat’ 
of (economic) globalization in light of apparently increased protectionism and the fracturing of 
free trade agreements (e.g. Brexit in the EU), need to be informed by a more sophisticated 
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conception of what regionalization might be. The reconfiguration of regional trade alignments, or 
new institutional barriers emerging in the global economic landscape, should not simply be 
equated with some kind of deglobalization and a re-emphasis on the region. 
 This is not to argue that there is no value in either the concept of economic regionalization 
nor that researching this process is not important. In drawing some conclusions for the future 
development of research and thinking, I would end by arguing that there is a need to develop a 
much more sophisticated theoretical understanding of how regional economies are bound into 
activities of proximate and distant actors. People still live and work in regions, and economic 
activity always takes place somewhere, so the concept of the regional economy (definitional 
issues notwithstanding) and the idea of regionalization have considerable utility. Social scientific 
research and thinking around global production networks (GPNs) and transnational firms has 
provided a powerful basis for a more spatially-sophisticated of the nature of regional economic 
space, but there is considerable scope for developing these ideas further. Such approaches have, 
for example, not pushed the understanding of the role of trans-regional institutional or socio-
cultural linkages and their influence on regional economic trajectories to the same degree as that 
around firms or supply chains. In that respect, future theories of economic regionalization could 
begin to better understand the complex interaction of economic and non-economic factors that 
‘perforate’ (c.f. Amin 2002) regional economic space from within and without of territorial 
boundaries. This should move the debate beyond simplistic either / or understandings of 
regionalization and globalization, and  it is in this direction that it seems likely future thinking on 
the process of economic regionalization will continue to evolve. 
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